International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) 2026

19th SAGT 2026 -- 15-18 September 2026 @ University of Augsburg
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The 19th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) will be held at the University of Augsburg, Germany, on 15-18 September 2026. A Pre-SAGT workshop on Mechanisms with Predictions will be held from 14-15 September 2026, directly before the conference (see details below).

 

The purpose of SAGT is to bring together researchers from Computer Science, Economics, Mathematics, Operations Research, and related fields to present and discuss original research at the intersection of Algorithms and Game Theory.

 

Foundational work is solicited on topics including but not limited to:


•   Solution Concepts in Game Theory
•   Efficiency of Equilibria and Price of Anarchy
•   Computational Aspects of Equilibria
•   Learning and Dynamics in Games
•   Game Theoretical Aspects of Networks
•   Auction Design and Analysis
•   Algorithmic Contract Design
•   Mechanism Design and Pricing
•   Internet Economics and Computational Advertising
•   Reputation, recommendation and trust systems
•   Economic Aspects of Distributed Computing
•   Blockchain and Cryptocurrencies
•   Decision Theory and Information Design
•   Computational Social Choice and Fair Division
•   Market Design and Matching Markets
•    Cooperative Game Theory
 
The registration for SAGT 2026 and for the Pre-SAGT Workshop on Mechanisms with Predictions is open! 
For all participants, we recommend to start booking the trip early as hotel prices in Augsburg will rise quickly due to Munich Oktoberfest, which starts right after SAGT 2026 ends. Please see the timeline below as an orientation for booking your trip to Augsburg.

Timeline: 

 

14 Sep 2026, noon: Start of the Pre-SAGT Workshop

15 Sep 2026, late afternoon: End of the Pre-SAGT Workshop

15 Sep 2026, evening: SAGT 2026 Welcome Reception with SAGT Pub Quiz

16 - 18 Sep 2026: SAGT 2026 main conference

16 Sep 2026, late afternoon: SAGT 2026 Poster Session preceeded by lightning talks

17 Sep 2026, evening: SAGT 2026 conference dinner

18 Sep 2026, early afternoon: End of SAGT 2026 main conference 

Call for Participation: Registration is open!

 

 

Early-Registration ends on 26 August 2026.
 
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Latest News

Download the pdf

 

SAGT26_abstracts.pdf


All times are CEST.
 

Monday  |  14 Sep 2026
13:00 -- 14:00 Workshop Registration + Lunch
14:00 -- 15:30 Workshop Lecture 1
15:30 -- 16:00 Coffee
16:00 -- 17:30 Workshop Exercises + Discussion 1
19:00 Workshop Dinner (self paid)
 
Tuesday  |  15 Sep 2026
09:00 -- 10:30 Workshop Lecture 2
10:30 -- 11:00 Coffee
11:00 -- 12:30 Workshop Exercises + Discussion 2
12:30 -- 13:30 Lunch
13:30 -- 15:00 Workshop Lecture 3
15:00 -- 15:30 Coffee
15:30 -- 17:00 Workshop Exercises + Discussion 3
17:00 -- 18:00 SAGT Registration + Coffee
18:00 -- 18:10 SAGT Opening
18:10 -- 19:30 SAGT Welcome Reception
19:30 -- 22:00 SAGT Pub Quiz
 
Wednesday  |  16 Sep 2026
09:30 -- 10:45 Invited Talk: Beyond Monotonicity: Learning in Bayesian Games
Martin Bichler
10:45 -- 11:15 Coffee
11:15 -- 12:30

Paper Talks (3 × 20 minutes)

Stability in Combinatorial Markets with Side Payments. Alexander Grosz and Chiara Vanoli

Perpetually Fair Assignments Via Balanced Sequences of Permutations. Terrence Adams and Erel Segal-Halevi

Distributed Agent-Constrained Truthful Facility Location. Argyrios Deligkas, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos and Alexandros Voudouris

12:30 -- 14:00 Lunch
14:00 -- 15:15

Paper Talks (3 × 20 minutes)

Minimizing Cumulative Envy in Allocating a Sequence of Items. Paul Goldberg, Isaac Robinson and Nicholas Teh

Distributionally Robust Contract Design with Deferred Inspection. Halil Ibrahim Bayrak and Martin Bichler

On the Power of Deception in Repeated Games. Melissa Dutz, Dimitar Chakarov, Saba Ahmadi and Avrim Blum

15:15 -- 15:45 Coffee
15:45 -- 16:15

Poster Lightning Talks (14 x 2 minutes)

Support Collapse from Entropic First-Order Stationarity in First-Price Auctions. Philip Hierhager
Tight Asymptotic Bounds for Fair Division with Externalities, Šimon Schierreich
Proportionality of Allocations Derived from the Cayley Tables of Cyclic Groups, Terrence Adams
Solving Games Faster than GAMUT can Generate Them, Tomas Votroubek
Not Obviously Manipulable Mechanisms in Facility Location Games: Characterization and Optimal Approximation, Shota Miyamoto
Simultaneous Ordinal Maximin Share and Envy-Based Guarantees, Timo Reichert
Improved Approximation Guarantees for Groupwise Maximin Share Fairness, Christodoulos Santorinaios
Simple PLS-Hardness for α Equilibria in Congestion Games, Johannes Tantow
Heterogeneous Routing Games, Nicole Schröder
Realist Vampire(s) Seeking Consenting Suicidal Person(s), Fabien Mathieu
GisMap - A Graph is Worth a Thousand .bib Entries, Fabien Mathieu
Truthful Path Auctions from Predictions to Learned Reserves via Self-Exclusion, Yi-Zhe Su
Complexity of Eliminating (Majority) Illusion in Directed Networks, Sougata Jana
An Entropy Potential for Type-Composition Games, Morteza Alimi

16:15 -- 17:15 Poster Session
17:15 -- 18:00

Paper Talks (2 × 20 minutes)

Computing Fair and Efficient Indivisible Chore Allocations with Bounded Surplus. Nicholas Teh

Network Allocation Games with Anonymous Preferences. Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Šimon Schierreich and Alexandros Voudouris

18:15 Hike + Dinner at a nearby Beer Garden (self paid)
 
Thursday  |  17 Sep 2026
09:00 -- 10:15

Paper Talks (3 × 20 minutes)

Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Goods with Structured Constraints. Kui-Wang Choi and Minming Li

Robustness of Persuasion to Receiver Preferences. Ronen Gradwohl, Fengming Hu and Rann Smorodinsky

Improved Lower Bounds and Output Augmentation for Facility Location Mechanisms. Rafael Gomes, Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer and Jens Schlöter

10:15 -- 10:35 Coffee Break
10:35 -- 11:50

Paper Talks (3 × 20 minutes)

Simultaneous Ordinal Maximin Share and Envy-Based Guarantees. Timo Reichert and Hannaneh Akrami

Single-Agent Stability in Additively Separable Hedonic Games with Constrained Coalition Sizes. Martin Bullinger, Adam Dunajski, Edith Elkind and Matan Gilboa

Control and Bribery in Stable Marriage and Roommates: A Complete Complexity Landscape. Jiehua Chen and Ildikó Schlotter

11:50 -- 13:00 Lunch
13:00 -- 14:15

Paper Talks (3 × 20 minutes)

Fair Division with Binary Valuations: Characterizations. Florian Brandl, Warut Suksompong and Nicholas Teh

Bribery’s Influence on Ranked Aggregation. Pallavi Jain and Anshul Thakur

Individual Rationality in Constrained Hedonic Games: Friends, Enemies, and Neutrals. Šimon Schierreich and Ildikó Schlotter

14:15 -- 14:35 Coffee
14:35 -- 15:50

Paper Talks (3 × 20 minutes)

Improved Approximation Guarantees for Groupwise Maximin Share Fairness. Georgios Amanatidis, Anna Korfiati, Evangelos Markakis and Christodoulos Santorinaios

Nucleolus Computation by Non-Zero-Constrained Optimization. Daniel Ebert and Antonia Ellerbrock

Hospitals/Residents with Inseparable Couples: Finding a Coalition-Stable Assignment Is NP-Hard. Zeyuan Hu and Greg Plaxton

15:50 -- 16:10 Coffee
16:10 -- 17:25 Invited Talk: EIP-1559: A Five-Year Retrospective 
Tim Roughgarden
18:30 -- 19:30 Guided Augsburg City Tour
19:30 -- 23:00 SAGT Conference Dinner
 
Friday  |  18 Sep 2026
09:00 -- 10:15 Invited Talk: When It's All Relative: Equilibria and Efficiency in Rank-Based Games
Tami Tamir
10:15 -- 10:35 Coffee
10:35 -- 11:50

Paper Talks (3 × 20 minutes)

Leveraging Matchings in Constrained Fair Division with a Conflict Graph. Evangelos Markakis and Michalis Samaris

Realist Vampire(s) Seeking Consenting Suicidal Person(s). Fabien Mathieu

Complexity of Eliminating (Majority) Illusion in Directed Networks. Sougata Jana and Sanjukta Roy

11:50 -- 13:00 Lunch
13:00 -- 14:15

Best Paper Talks + Business Meeting + Closing

Best Paper: Extension of Excess Demand Ascending Auction to Multi-Demand Model by Discrete Convex Analysis Approach. Kazuo Murota and Akiyoshi Shioura

Best Paper: Efficiently Restructuring Sovereign Debt via Arctic Auctions with Convex Costs. Jugal Garg, Edwin Lock and Vijay Vazirani

 

The registration for SAGT 2026 and for the Pre-SAGT Workshop on Mechanisms with Predictions is open! 
For all participants, we recommend to already start booking the trip as hotel prices in Augsburg will rise quickly due to Munich Oktoberfest, which starts right after SAGT 2026 ends. Please see the timeline below as an orientation for booking your trip to Augsburg.

Timeline: 

 

14 Sep 2026, noon: Start of the Pre-SAGT Workshop

15 Sep 2026, late afternoon: End of the Pre-SAGT Workshop

15 Sep 2026, evening: SAGT 2026 Welcome Reception with SAGT Pub Quiz

16 - 18 Sep 2026: SAGT 2026 main conference

16 Sep 2026, evening: SAGT 2026 Poster Session preceeded by lightning talks

17 Sep 2026, evening: SAGT 2026 conference dinner

18 Sep 2026, early afternoon: End of SAGT 2026 main conference 

 

 

Register now

 

Early-Registration ends on 26 August 2026.

SAGT 2026 will include a poster session where participants can present posters of preliminary working papers as well as papers accepted at SAGT 2026 or previously published at other conferences. We plan to have short lightning talks (3 minutes per poster) to introduce the posters.

 

Posters will be displayed at the conference venue throughout the event, from the afternoon of Sep 16 to Sep 18. A dedicated poster session (preceded by the lightning talks) on Wed Sep 16 will be included in the program.

 

Submission of posters will be open for all participants, and we will conduct a basic quality check to verify that accepted posters will contain interesting and relevant information.

If you wish to present a poster, register for the conference and send us your poster via email to: SAGT2026@informatik.uni-augsburg.de

 

Poster submission deadline: 07 September 2026

 

The Program Committee decided on two SAGT 2026 Best Paper Awards. 

 

The SAGT 2026 Best Paper Awards go to: 
 
Kazuo Murota and Akiyoshi Shioura. Extension of Excess Demand Ascending Auction to Multi-Demand Model by Discrete Convex Analysis Approach
 
and
 
Jugal Garg, Edwin Lock and Vijay Vazirani. Efficiently Restructuring Sovereign Debt via Arctic Auctions with Convex Costs.
 
Congratulations!

The following posters got the SAGT 2026 Best Poster Award: 

  • Simultaneous Ordinal Maximin Share and Envy-Based Guarantees, Timo Reichert
  • Heterogeneous Routing Games, Nicole Schröder
  • Realist Vampire(s) Seeking Consenting Suicidal Person(s), Fabien Mathieu

Congratulations!

The following talks got the SAGT 2026 Best Presentation Awards: 

  • Stability in Combinatorial Markets with Side Payments. Chiara Vanoli
  • Improved Lower Bounds and Output Augmentation for Facility Location Mechanisms. Rafael Gomes

Congratulations!


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Gallery

 
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SAGT Invited Speakers

 

Profile
Martin Bichler
TU Munich, Germany
 
Tim Roughgarden
Tim Roughgarden
Institute of Advanced Study, USA
Tim Roughgarden
Tami Tamir
Reichman University, Israel

 

Invited Talks:

 
Abstract: Algorithmic agents increasingly interact in auctions and other digital markets, raising fundamental questions about equilibrium computation and learning. This talk studies learning in Bayesian games, with a particular focus on auctions. We discuss how no-regret and gradient-based methods can approximate Bayes–Nash equilibria and when their iterates converge. Surprisingly, standard sufficient conditions such as monotonicity and the Minty condition fail even in canonical auction environments, despite robust numerical convergence. To explain this behavior, we develop tailored Lyapunov arguments for finite-dimensional approximations and continuous strategy spaces. These results illustrate why understanding algorithmic markets requires moving beyond classical monotone-game theory toward a direct analysis of their learning dynamics.

 
Abstract: Five years ago there was a remarkable confluence between practice, in the adoption by the Ethereum blockchain protocol of a novel mechanism for transaction pricing; and theory, in the development of the field of transaction fee mechanism design. This talk will survey the major developments, in both theory and practice, since then.
Abstract:
Two hikers are being chased by a bear. Suddenly, one stops to put on running shoes.
"What are you doing?" the other asks. "Those won't help you run faster than a bear!"
"I don’t need to run faster than the bear," he replies. "I just need to run faster than you".
 

 

In standard congestion games, players aim to minimize their absolute cost. In this talk, we consider a natural variant arising in competitive environments, where the goal is to perform well relative to competitors.  Specifically, players have lexicographic preferences: their primary objective is to minimize their rank within the cost vector, with the minimization of their actual cost serving as a secondary goal. We analyze how this ordinal twist disrupts standard game properties. We explore its impact on equilibrium existence, computational complexity, the convergence of best-response dynamics, and equilibrium inefficiency. Our analysis covers several specific, well-explored congestion and cost-sharing games, such as job scheduling and network routing. As we show, the rank-based objective significantly influences the strategic landscape of the game, transforming some environments with guaranteed stability and exact potential functions into settings where convergence is fragile, and equilibria are computationally hard to find or highly inefficient.



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Pre-SAGT  Workshop on Mechanisms with Predictions
 

Lecturers:
 

Profile
Vasilis Gkatzelis
Drexel University, USA

 
Profile
Guido Schäfer
CWI Amsterdam, Netherlands
 
Details:
 

The workshop will consist of interactive lectures and exercises given by Vasilis Gkatzelis and Guido Schäfer. The goal is to gently introduce the exiting new field of mechanisms with predictions to young researchers. Thus, the workshop is intended for studends and early-career researchers. Of course, more senior researchers are very welcome as well!

 

The Pre-SAGT workshop can be combined with SAGT conference attendance or it can be booked as a stand alone event. Feel free to join!  

 

Timeline: 

Start: 14 September 2026 at noon

End: 15 September 2026 late afternoon

 

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Accepted Papers

• Perpetually Fair Assignments Via Balanced Sequences of Permutations. Terrence Adams and Erel Segal-Halevi

• Extension of Excess Demand Ascending Auction to Multi-Demand Model by Discrete Convex Analysis Approach. Kazuo Murota and Akiyoshi Shioura

• Minimizing Cumulative Envy in Allocating a Sequence of Items. Paul Goldberg, Isaac Robinson and Nicholas Teh

• Computing Fair and Efficient Indivisible Chore Allocations with Bounded Surplus. Nicholas Teh

• Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Goods with Structured Constraints. Kui-Wang Choi and Minming Li

• Stability in Combinatorial Markets with Side Payments. Alexander Grosz and Chiara Vanoli

• Efficiently Restructuring Sovereign Debt via Arctic Auctions with Convex Costs. Jugal Garg, Edwin Lock and Vijay Vazirani

• Distributed Agent-Constrained Truthful Facility Location. Argyrios Deligkas, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos and Alexandros Voudouris

• Simultaneous Ordinal Maximin Share and Envy-Based Guarantees. Timo Reichert and Hannaneh Akrami

• Control and Bribery in Stable Marriage and Roommates: A Complete Complexity Landscape. Jiehua Chen and Ildikó Schlotter

• Fair Division with Binary Valuations: Characterizations. Florian Brandl, Warut Suksompong and Nicholas Teh

• On the Power of Deception in Repeated Games. Melissa Dutz, Dimitar Chakarov, Saba Ahmadi and Avrim Blum

• Robustness of Persuasion to Receiver Preferences. Ronen Gradwohl, Fengming Hu and Rann Smorodinsky

• Network Allocation Games with Anonymous Preferences. Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Šimon Schierreich and Alexandros Voudouris

• Improved Lower Bounds and Output Augmentation for Facility Location Mechanisms. Rafael Gomes, Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer and Jens Schlöter

• Single-Agent Stability in Additively Separable Hedonic Games with Constrained Coalition Sizes. Martin Bullinger, Adam Dunajski, Edith Elkind and Matan Gilboa

• Distributionally Robust Contract Design with Deferred Inspection. Halil Ibrahim Bayrak and Martin Bichler

• Bribery’s Influence on Ranked Aggregation. Pallavi Jain and Anshul Thakur

• Improved Approximation Guarantees for Groupwise Maximin Share Fairness. Georgios Amanatidis, Anna Korfiati, Evangelos Markakis and Christodoulos Santorinaios

• Individual Rationality in Constrained Hedonic Games: Friends, Enemies, and Neutrals. Šimon Schierreich and Ildikó Schlotter

• Leveraging Matchings in Constrained Fair Division with a Conflict Graph. Evangelos Markakis and Michalis Samaris

• Realist Vampire(s) Seeking Consenting Suicidal Person(s). Fabien Mathieu

• Nucleolus Computation by Non-Zero-Constrained Optimization. Daniel Ebert and Antonia Ellerbrock

• Hospitals/Residents with Inseparable Couples: Finding a Coalition-Stable Assignment Is NP-Hard. Zeyuan Hu and Greg Plaxton

• Complexity of Eliminating (Majority) Illusion in Directed Networks. Sougata Jana and Sanjukta Roy

Black Line Icon for Board, Member and Director Stock Vector - Illustration  of symbol, vector: 209558556
 


Program Committee
 

Andreas Abels, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Germany
Elliot Anshelevich, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, USA
Vittorio Bilò, University of Salento, Italy
Davide Bilò, University of L'Aquila, Italy
Georgios Birmpas, University of Liverpool, UK
Martin Bullinger, University of Bristol, UK
Javier Cembrano, Universidad de Chile, Chile
Ágnes Cseh, University of Bayreuth, Germany
Bart de Keijzer, King's College London, UK
Argyrios Deligkas, Royal Holloway University of London, UK
Angelo Fanelli, CNRS, France
Yiding Feng, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong
Diodato Ferraioli, University of Salento, Italy
Aris Filos-Ratsikas, University of Edinburgh, UK
Dimitris Fotakis, National Technical University of Athens, Greece
Paul Goldberg, University of Oxford, UK
Lukas Graf, University of Passau, Germany
Svenja Griesbach, RWTH Aachen, Germany
Sushmita Gupta, The Institute of Mathematical Sciences, India
Guillaume Haeringer, Baruch College, USA
Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Aarhus University, Denmark
Martin Hoefer, RWTH Aachen, Germany
Anthony Kim, Sungkyunkwan University, Korea
Pieter Kleer, Tilburg University, Netherlands
Max Klimm, Technische Universität Berlin, Germany
Dušan Knop, Czech Technical University in Prague, Czechia
Piotr Krysta, Augusta University, USA
Pascal Lenzner, University of Augsburg, Germany (co-chair)
Bo Li, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong
Minming Li, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Tao Lin, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Ankur Mani, University of Minnesota, USA
David Manlove, University of Glasgow, UK
Vangelis Markakis, Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece
Francisco Javier Marmolejo Cossio, Harvard University, USA
Claudio Mezzetti, The University of Queensland, Australia
Tim Oosterwijk, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands
Sigal Oren, Ben-Gurion University, Israel
Maria Polukarov, King's College London, UK
Baharak Rastegari, University of Southampton, UK
Doron Ravid, University of Michigan, USA
Rebecca Reiffenhäuser, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands
Shaul Rosner, Tel Aviv University, Israel
Jörg Rothe, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Germany
Guido Schäfer, CWI Amsterdam, Netherlands
Šimon Schierreich, AGH University of Krakow, Poland
Daniel Schmand, University of Bremen, Germany (co-chair)
Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, TU Eindhoven, Netherlands
Daniel Schoepflin, Rutgers University, USA
Marc Schröder, Maastricht University, Netherlands
Golnoosh Shahkarami, University of Bremen, Germany
Alexander Skopalik, University of Twente, Netherlands
Maximilian Stahlberg, University of Bremen, Germany
Yixin Tao, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China
Artem Tsikiridis, TU Munich, Germany
Marc Uetz, University of Twente, Netherlands
Giovanna Varricchio, Università della Calabria, Italy
Carmine Ventre, King's College London, UK
Adrian Vetta, McGill University, Canada
Anaëlle Wilczynski, Université Paris-Saclay, France
Jie Zhang, University of Bath, UK
Hanrui Zhang, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

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Hotels & Transportation
 

 

Hotels in Augsburg

Augsburg has many hotels. However, for your convenience, we advise you to avoid taking a hotel in the north of Augsburg, as the travel time could be too high.


From the city center (Königsplatz), you can travel to the university within 15 - 20 minutes, using public transport. Thus, we recommend choosing a hotel located somewhere between Königsplatz and the university, or a hotel that is moderately close to a stop of the tram line 3.
 

Transportation





Deutschlandticket – Wikipedia

If you plan to travel via regional trains (e.g. from Munich airport to Augsburg), we recommend the Deutschlandticket. It costs 63 euros per month and offers unlimited travel on local and regional public transport (buses, trams, S-Bahn, U-Bahn, and regional trains) across Germany.


We recommend buying it via the official DB Navigator app or website, or through Mopla.

Please Note: IC, EC, ICE trains are not included. The ticket is a monthly subscription, so it must be purchased in advance and canceled by the 10th of the month, otherwise it renews automatically. Thus, we recommend buying it before 10 Sep 2026 and then to directly cancel the contract to avoid renewal.

 
Location - Wikipedia


Time and Location

Location

Conference: University of Augsburg, Universitätsstraße 6a, 86159 Augsburg, Germany. Computer Science Building (Building N, main campus), Lecture Hall 2045N
 


Arriving at Lecture Hall 2045N

Address:
Universitätsstraße 6a
86159 Augsburg


To reach the workshop room after you exit the tram at the stop "Universität", head south and follow the pedestrian path until you encounter a big crossing. At the crossing, head right and walk until you arrive at the sculpture of a red trojan horse.Look into the direction the horse is looking and enter through the door you see on the ground level. If you enter through this door, the lecture hall 2045N, is directly in front of you.

 

map
Google Maps
 
Lecture room
https://ingesidee.de/de/kunst-im-oeffentlichen-raum/trojaner-un

 

Workshop dinner: Riegele Wirtshaus

Conference dinner: Wirtshaus unter dem Bogen


3 Hotels Icon Grafik Von marco.livolsi2014 · Creative Fabrica


Travel Recommendations

 

 

Beyond Augsburg, visitors can easily explore some nearby cities such as Munich with its historic landmarks and beer gardens, Ulm with its scenic Danube views and record-breaking church steeple, and Nuremberg with its medieval Old Town and rich history. The highlights of the area are the following:

 

Fuggerei

 




 

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Fuggerei is the world’s oldest social housing complex still in use, founded in 1521 by the Fugger family. This historic neighborhood is known for its charming narrow streets, colorful houses, and peaceful atmosphere in Augsburg. Visitors can explore museum apartments, learn about over 500 years of social history, and experience one of the city’s most unique cultural landmarks.

 

Oktoberfest & Plärrer

 




 

15 famous castles near Munich, Germany [+ insider tips from a local]

 

Held annually in Munich, Oktoberfest is the world’s largest beer festival and one of Bavaria’s most celebrated traditions. In 2026, Oktoberfest will take place from September 19 to October 4, welcoming millions of visitors to experience lively beer tents, traditional Bavarian music, local cuisine, and cultural events. If you want a smaller version, you can also visit the "Plärrer" in Augsburg, which runs until 11pm on September 13.

 

Neuschwanstein Castle
 




 

15 famous castles near Munich, Germany [+ insider tips from a local]

 

Often referred to as the “Disney Castle,” Neuschwanstein Castle is one of Germany’s most iconic landmarks and the inspiration behind the famous Disney castle design. Nestled in the Bavarian Alps, the fairy-tale palace was commissioned by King Ludwig II of Bavaria and captivates visitors with its dramatic towers and breathtaking mountain scenery.

Important Dates
 

Abstract Submission: 20 May 2026, AoE

Full paper submission: 26 May 2026, AoE

Notification: 09 July 2026

Camera Ready Submission: 24 July 2026, AoE
 
Conference: September 15 - 18, 2026
 

​​​​​Submission instructions

Authors are invited to submit original research for possible presentation at the conference. Each paper will be evaluated on significance, originality, technical quality, and exposition. It should clearly establish the research contribution, its relevance, and its relation to prior research.

 

Where to Submit

SAGT 2026 uses Easychair.
Submission is closed.

 

 

Submissions must be anonymous. SAGT 2026 will use double-blind reviewing like WINE, EC, and all other major conferences. Submissions should not reveal the identity of the authors in any way. In particular, authors’ names, affiliations, and email addresses should not appear anywhere in the submission. (In LNCS, \author{} and \institute{} fields should not be included.) Authors should refer to their prior work in a neutral manner (for example, say “XYZ showed” instead of “we showed”). Submissions may include work that has been publicly presented (as long as it has not appeared in published proceedings) or posted on arXiv or similar online repositories, provided that the submission itself is properly anonymized.

Submissions may be up to 18 pages long (including title page and references) in LNCS format. Note that SAGT 2026 requires submissions in LNCS format (provided as part of Springer's LaTeX2e package). In addition, an appendix may be included at the end of the paper and will be read at the discretion of the reviewers. Submissions deviating from these guidelines may be rejected without review.

Authors are strongly encouraged to structure their paper in a way that includes a clear presentation of the merits of the paper and a discussion of the importance of the results, as well as an exposition of the key conceptual and technical ideas.

A conflict of interest (COI) is limited to the following categories:

•  Family member or close friend

•  Ph.D. advisor or advisee (no time limit), or postdoctoral or undergraduate mentor or mentee within the past five years

•  Person with the same affiliation

•  Involved in an alleged incident of harassment (it is not required that the incident be reported)

•  Reviewer owes the author a favor (e.g., recently requested a reference letter)

•  Frequent or recent collaborator, i.e., current joint work in progress or joint publication within the last 5 years, whom you believe cannot objectively review your work

The symposium proceedings will be published by Springer as a Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS) proceedings volume. Accepted papers will be allocated at most 18 pages (including title page and references) in LNCS format in the proceedings. Please refer to Springer's Information for Authors for detailed guidelines on how to prepare the final manuscript.

To accommodate the publishing traditions of different fields, authors of accepted papers can choose to publish a one-page abstract of their paper in the proceedings. The paper must then provide a URL referring to the full version of the paper; authors should guarantee the link to be reliable for at least two years. Such papers must be formatted and submitted just like regular papers (as described above).

Results previously published or presented at another archival conference prior to SAGT, or published (or accepted for publication) at a journal prior to the submission deadline, will not be considered for publication. Simultaneous submission to WINE 2026 is explicitly allowed. In case the paper is accepted for publication at SAGT, the authors have to withdraw the paper from WINE 2026. Simultaneous submission to other conferences with published proceedings is not allowed. Simultaneous submission of results to a journal is allowed only if the authors publish the paper as a one-page abstract in SAGT 2026.

 
Conference participants will have free access to the online conference proceedings of SAGT 2026.

SAGT 2026 will extend invitations to a selection of accepted papers for publication in a dedicated special issue of the ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) (details will be communicated in due course).

The SAGT proceedings of previous years are available on SpringerLink

Due to generous funding from Springer LNCS we will offer a Best Paper Award.

 

Also, as a novelty, we will honor the best conference presentation with a Best Presentation Award.  

Location - Wikipedia

History of SAGT

•  SAGT 2025, Bath                        

•  SAGT 2024, Amsterdam         

•  SAGT 2023, London               

•  SAGT 2022, Colchester    

•  SAGT 2021, Aarhus  
 
•  SAGT 2020, Virtual Event
 
•  SAGT 2018, Beijing
 
•  SAGT 2017, L'Aquila
•  SAGT 2015, Saarbrücken

•  SAGT 2014, Patras

•  SAGT 2013, Aachen

•  SAGT 2012, Barcelona

•  SAGT 2011, Salerno

•  SAGT 2008, Paderborn

Organization

 

 

General Chairs: 
•  Pascal Lenzner, University of Augsburg

•  Daniel Schmand, University of Bremen

 

Local Organizers: 

•  Pascal Lenzner, University of Augsburg
•  Paraskevi Machaira, Hasso Plattner Institute
•  Daniel Schmand, University of Bremen
•  Marcus Wunderlich, University of Augsburg
 
Contact: SAGT2026@informatik.uni-augsburg.de
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© Universität Augsburg

Sponsors
 

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