SAGT 2020 Accepted Papers

  1. Rajnish Kumar, Kriti Manocha and Josue Ortega. On the integration of Shapley-Scarf matching markets
  2. Marc Schröder. Price of anarchy in congestion games with altruistic/spiteful players
  3. Jonas Israel and Leon Sering. The Impact of Spillback on the Price of Anarchy for Flows Over Time
  4. Hoang Minh Pham and Leon Sering. Dynamic Equilibria in Time-Varying Networks
  5. Shaul Rosner and Tami Tamir. Race Scheduling Games
  6. Bart Smeulders, Danny Blom and Frits Spieksma. The Stackelberg Kidney Exchange Problem is $ \Sigma_2^P $ -complete
  7. Bruno Escoffier, Olivier Spanjaard and Magdalena Tydrichova. Recognizing Single-Peaked Preferences on an Arbitrary Graph: Complexity and Algorithms
  8. Eirini Georgoulaki, Kostas Kollias and Tami Tamir. Equilibrium Inefficiency in Resource Buying Games with Load-Dependent Costs
  9. Prem Krishnaa J, Girija Limaye, Meghana Nasre and Prajakta Nimbhorkar. Envy-freeness and Relaxed Stability : Hardness and Approximation Algorithms
  10. Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier and Adrian Vetta. Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions with No Overbidding
  11. Mashbat Suzuki and Adrian Vetta. How Many Freemasons Are There? The Consensus Voting Mechanism in Metric Spaces
  12. Nawal Benabbou, Mithun Chakraborty, Ayumi Igarashi and Yair Zick. Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations when Valuations Don’t Add Up
  13. Vittorio Bilò and Cosimo Vinci. Congestion Games with Priority-Based Scheduling
  14. Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou and Alexandros Voudouris. Modified Schelling Games
  15. Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Alexander Hammerl and Diogo Poças. A New Lower Bound for Deterministic Truthful Scheduling
  16. Ioannis Anagnostides, Dimitris Fotakis and Panagiotis Patsilinakos. Asymptotically Optimal Communication in Simple Mechanisms
  17. Jochen Koenemann, Kanstantsin Pashkovich and Natig Tofigzade. On the Approximability of the Stable Matching Problem with Ties of Constant Size up to the Integrality Gap
  18. Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Georgy Noarov and Andreas S. Schulz. Computing Approximate Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games via Best-Responses
  19. Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Klaus Heeger and Rolf Niedermeier. Bribery and Control in Stable Marriage
  20. Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk and Rolf Niedermeier. Line-Up Elections: Parallel Voting with Shared Candidate Pool
  21. William Brown and Utkarsh Patange. Targeted Intervention in Random Graphs
  22. Yiannis Giannakopoulos and Diogo Poças. A Unifying Approximate Potential for Weighted Congestion Games
  23. Jochen Koenemann and Justin Toth. A General Framework for Computing the Nucleolus Via Dynamic Programming
  24. Giannis Fikioris and Dimitris Fotakis. Mechanism Design for Perturbation Stable Combinatorial Auctions